To President Trump!
September 15, 2026 [Proposal of the Day] Triggered by U.S. Treasury Secretary Bes-sent's statements correcting the weak yen, this proposal analyzes the impact of cor-recting the extreme weak yen and the recovery of the yen's strength, considers as-sumptions of selling foreign exchange reserves and shocks to financial markets, eval-uates the effects on Japanese import prices and export-oriented companies, aims for an optimal equilibrium point around 100 yen, and emphasizes the importance of building a sustainable international trade order through the introduction of "Equilibri-um Compensating Tariffs." (Yasuhiro Nagano)
1 [Meaning of the U.S. Treasury Secretary's Statement on Correcting the Weak Yen] The background behind U.S. Treasury Secretary Bessent stating that he "strongly supports Japan's resolute measures and interest rate hikes" is a sense of crisis that the current extreme weak yen is beginning to break the equilibrium of international finance. For both Japan and the U.S., the 160 yen range is unstable, making the normalization of exchange rates inevitable. (Yasuhiro Nagano)
2 [A Stronger Yen is Not Dollar Depreciation, But the Recovery of the Yen's Strength] A strong yen does not mean dollar depreciation; rather, it is a phenomenon where the yen strengthens against the dollar. The U.S. faces inconveniences with both a strong and weak dollar, and a strong yen is not necessarily bad for the U.S. Instead, it has the effect of lowering import prices of Japanese products and suppressing con-sumer prices within the U.S. (Yasuhiro Nagano)
3 [Assumption of Japan Selling Foreign Exchange Reserves] If Japan sells half of its foreign exchange reserves (approximately 500 billion dollars) and moves to buy yen, a historical shock wave will ripple through the foreign exchange market. Dollar sales on the scale of hundreds of billions of dollars would exceed the absorption capacity of the market, likely causing the yen to surge by tens of yen per dollar. (Yasuhiro Na-gano)
4 [The Boomerang Effect on Japan Itself] The majority of Japan's foreign exchange reserves are U.S. Treasuries, and large-scale sales would trigger a plunge in U.S. Treasury prices. As a result, this becomes a structural boomerang where Japan itself incurs massive valuation losses, leaving a serious scar on the Ministry of Finance's balance sheet. (Yasuhiro Nagano)
5 [Financial Market Shocks Caused by a Strong Yen] With carry trades—borrowing the yen cheaply to invest in dollar assets—having grown massive today, a rapid ap-preciation of the yen triggers a global unwinding of positions. Stock, bond, and com-modity markets could experience wild fluctuations, potentially causing a Lehman-scale financial shock. (Yasuhiro Nagano)
6 [Limited Impact on the U.S. Economy] A strong yen is a blow to export-oriented companies targeting Japan, but overall in the U.S., the import prices of Japanese products will fall, providing a positive boost to consumers and corporate costs. Even during the 75-yen era in 2011, the U.S. economy did not collapse, and a strong yen alone does not sink the U.S. structure. (Yasuhiro Nagano)
7 [Benefits to Japan's Import Prices and Consumers] A strong yen significantly push-es down Japan's import prices. Food and energy prices drop, and real wages improve. This is a welcome environment for consumers, leading to the stabilization of living costs. (Yasuhiro Nagano)
8 [Serious Blow to Exporting Companies] On the other hand, exporting companies will see profits plummet and stock prices drop. Although major corporations like Toyota and Sony have increased their overseas production ratios, a rapid appreciation of the yen brings major pain to their profit structures. (Yasuhiro Nagano)
9 [Lessons Left by the Super-Strong Yen of 2011] During the period of 75 yen per dollar, Japanese companies pursued thorough rationalization and overseas relocation. This pain formed the current corporate strength. While a strong yen is painful in the short term, it also has aspects that lead to strengthened competitiveness in the long term. (Yasuhiro Nagano)
10 [Inducing from 160 Yen to 75 Yen is Impossible] For Japan to intentionally bring the rate back from 160 yen to 75 yen would require astronomical dollar selling, and mobilizing all foreign exchange reserves would not be enough. It is impossible both politically and in terms of international finance, making it an unrealistic policy choice. (Yasuhiro Nagano)
11 [An Optimal Equilibrium Point Around 100 Yen] A rate of around 100 yen per dol-lar satisfies three elements: the stabilization of import prices, the resilience of export-ing companies, and the stability of financial markets. It is the most balanced zone for both Japan and the U.S., serving as a realistic level to enhance exchange rate stabil-ity. (Yasuhiro Nagano)
12 [Historical Consistency of U.S.-China Trade Structure and the Strong Yen] The 1990s to 2010s saw the simultaneous progression of a strong yen/weak dollar and the expansion of U.S.-China trade. Japan shifted factories to China amid the strong yen, while American companies advanced fabless models. This structural change generated the current distortions in global trade. (Yasuhiro Nagano)
13 [Turmoil in U.S. Trade Policy] From this period onward, U.S. trade policy became unstable, turning exchange rates and trade deficits into political issues. While a strong yen inflicted pain on U.S. manufacturing, the benefit of consumer price stabil-ity simultaneously existed. (Yasuhiro Nagano)
14 [The Effectiveness of Equilibrium Compensating Tariffs] "Equilibrium Compensat-ing Tariffs," which balance imports and exports for each nation, are an ideal system that renders currency manipulation meaningless and brings trade stability. A settle-ment structure independent of exchange rates contributes to the sustainable stability of the international economy. (Yasuhiro Nagano)
15 [Conclusion: Exchange Rate Stability and a New International Trade System] A strong yen deals a major shock to Japan and the world, but stability around 100 yen is optimal for both nations. The introduction of equilibrium compensating tariffs can end currency wars and serve as a realistic solution to build a sustainable international trade order. (Yasuhiro Nagano)
Part 1 Related URL
U.S. Treasury Secretary Bessent singles out Japan, stating "Reflative policies should be stopped"... and calls for reviewing expansionary fiscal policy and raising interest rates
https://www.yomiuri.co.jp/economy/20260902-GYT1T00332/
I will write again tomorrow.
Yasuhiro Nagano (Japanese)
1. Weekday Edition (Logical Contradictions in Immigration Law Violation Cases - Chapters 1-2)
Part 2: The Immigration Control Act Violation Case [Weekday Edition]
Japan’s judicial system and immigration administration involve severe human rights violations that challenge international standards. Through my own experience, I strongly question Japan's status as a constitutional state governed by the rule of law.
Please first read how I was wrongfully implicated in a case of "Aiding and Abetting the Violation of the Immigration Control Act" in 2010.
Read the full text here: To World Media
https://toworldmedia.blogspot.com/
[Chapter 1] Case Overview
Autumn 2008: My company (where I serve as President) executed an employment contract with Chinese students holding student visas, promising to hire them upon their university graduation the following spring.
Late 2008: The Lehman Brothers bankruptcy triggered a global financial crisis, resulting in the abrupt cancellation of our upcoming system development projects.
2009: Due to the severe economic downturn, we were forced to rescind the job offers. Consequently, the graduated students had no choice but to continue working at the restaurants where they had been employed part-time during their studies.
May 2010: These former Chinese students were arrested for "Activities Other Than Those Permitted Under the Status of Residence" (Violation of Article 70 of the Immigration Control Act).
June 2010: I and our Chinese recruitment manager were also arrested. The charge brought against us was "Aiding and Abetting" (under the Penal Code) their unauthorized technical employment.
The Prosecution’s Logic: The prosecution asserted that our prior issuance of the employment contract constituted a "false document," which subsequently aided their unauthorized work.
[Chapter 2] Fatal Flaws in Judicial Interpretation
This indictment and subsequent judgment completely disregard fundamental legal principles, relying on an entirely arbitrary interpretation of the law.
Under Article 22-4, Paragraph 1, Item 4 of the Immigration Control Act at that time, submitting false documents merely granted the Minister of Justice the authority to revoke a residency status as an administrative disposition (leading to deportation). The act of submitting false documents itself was not codified as a criminal offense. Logically, one cannot be convicted of "aiding and abetting" an act that is not a crime in itself.
The court’s reasoning followed a convoluted chain of causality:
A residency status was obtained via a false employment contract.
The individuals resided in Japan based on that status.
Consequently, they engaged in unauthorized part-time work.
Therefore, the issuer of the initial contract aided and abetted the unauthorized work.
This is a far-fetched, flawed causal link that completely violates the principles of modern legal logic.
[My Argument]
Confusion of Administrative Dispositions and Criminal Penalties: The Immigration Control Act explicitly designates the consequences for false documentation as administrative measures (revocation of status and deportation). The legal process concludes there.
Absence of a Principal Offender: The actual employers of the restaurants where the students worked were never prosecuted for "Encouraging Illegal Employment" (Article 73-2 of the Immigration Control Act). Under the principle of equality under the law, it is a legal contradiction to punish us for aiding and abetting when the principal employers themselves were not prosecuted.
This same flawed legal doctrine was later improperly applied to diplomats and embassy staff.
Continued in the Saturday Edition.
Part 3: A New Business Model via Special Economic Zones
I propose the establishment of "Special Economic Zones" designed to accept refugees and migrants as "temporary migrant workers," with their residency restricted to these designated zones.
This framework offers a dual benefit: advanced nations secure low-cost labor to drive economic growth, while migrants receive human dignity, secure jobs, and free access to housing, food, healthcare, and education.
Global Special Zone Project NO2
https://world-special-zone.seesaa.net/
Nagano Opinion NO1
https://naganoopinion.blog.jp/
For details on Parts 4 through 10, please refer to the Sunday Edition.
Yasuhiro Nagano
Archive Blog (Past Articles): To World Media
https://toworldmedia.blogspot.com/
If you have any questions, please feel free to contact us!
enzai_mirai@yahoo.co.jp








