To President Trump: August 15, 2026 [US Leadership and the Takaichi Administration’s Piggybacking] While President Trump described the move as a "sign of friendship," it is more accurate to view this coordinated intervention as an initiative orchestrated by the Trump administration—one that the Takaichi administration simply jumped on board with. (Yasuhiro Nagano) [Pressure on the BOJ to Raise Rates and Speculation Regarding Fiscal Adjustments] Markets anticipate that the US will make further demands—such as pressing the Bank of Japan for an early interest rate hike and calling for revisions to fiscal policy or increases in defense spending—meaning this unusual instance of cooperation is generating significant repercussions. (Yasuhiro Nagano)

 To President Trump　

2026-08-15 [Today's Proposal] Behind the Scenes of the First Joint Yen-Buying Intervention in 28 Years by the U.S. and Japan, and the Path to Eliminating Trade Deficits Through "Balanced Countervailing Tariffs" That the Trump Ad-ministration Should Adopt

1.[First Joint Yen-Buying Intervention in 28 Years by the U.S. and Japan] The joint yen-buying intervention by the U.S. and Japan for the first time in 28 years is an unprecedented cooperative effort to prevent the depreciation of the yen, and I view this move as taking place while the Trump administration has shifted toward promoting exports. (Yasuhiro Nagano)

2.[U.S. Initiation and the Takaichi Administration's Bandwagoning] President Trump stated that this is "proof of friendship," but it is reasonable to view the reality as the Trump administration orchestrating this concerted intervention, with Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's administration simply jumping on the bandwagon. (Yasuhiro Nagano)

3.[Pressure on the Bank of Japan for Rate Hikes and Fiscal Correction Specula-tion] In the market, views have emerged that the U.S. side will pressure the Bank of Japan to raise interest rates early as its next step. With speculation growing that the U.S. will also demand corrections to fiscal policy and an in-crease in defense spending, this unusual coordination is bound to cause wide-spread repercussions. (Yasuhiro Nagano)

4.[Treasury Secretary Bessent's Statements and Policy Room] Treasury Secre-tary Scott Bessent pointed out that the BOJ's response to inflation has been "lagging behind the curve," and he has consistently emphasized the im-portance of "policy room" for the BOJ, keeping the Takaichi administration—which has been cautious about interest rate hikes—in mind. (Yasuhiro Nagano)

5.[Record-High Yen Appreciation under the DPJ Administration and Today's Drastic Change] During the DPJ administration under Prime Minister Naoto Kan, a record-breaking super-appreciation of the yen to the 75-yen level per dollar occurred along with yen-selling interventions. Today, the value of the yen has fallen to less than half of that, making the reason for high inflation crystal clear. (Yasuhiro Nagano)

6.[The Past Strength of the Yen that Overcame Major Disasters] Multiple rounds of yen-selling interventions were carried out in March (immediately following the Great East Japan Earthquake), August, and October of 2011 (when it plunged into the 75-yen range). Even amidst unprecedented disasters, the Jap-anese yen boasted overwhelming strength. (Yasuhiro Nagano)

7.[Drastic Fluctuations in Exchange Rates Due to Abenomics] Through Abenom-ics under the Abe administration, the currency shifted significantly from the super-appreciation of the 75-yen range during the DPJ era toward a weaker yen, temporarily reaching the 120-to-130-yen range (and later weakening fur-ther). (Yasuhiro Nagano)

8.[Past Discontent with a Strong Dollar and Today's Guidance Toward a Weak Dollar] Around 2013 when Abenomics began, the U.S. was in an economic re-covery phase following the Lehman shock, but the effects of the European sov-ereign debt crisis led to a relative "strong dollar" and subsequent complaints. Regarding the current guidance toward a weak dollar, while welcoming voices are heard from U.S. export companies that a weaker dollar restores U.S. com-petitiveness, rising import prices caused by a strong dollar are a source of con-cern. (Yasuhiro Nagano)

9.[Past Stance of the Trump Administration and Today's Intentions] When the Trump administration was born in 2017, President Trump occasionally made critical remarks that "Japan and China are gaining unfair advantages through currency devaluation manipulation." At that time, President Trump was strong. (Yasuhiro Nagano)

10.[Historical Coordination Where Both Sides Looked for an Opportunity] The viewpoint that "both sides were waiting for an opportunity" holds validity, as this latest "U.S.-Japan concerted intervention (such as buying yen and selling dollars)" appears to have been executed after both sides quietly timed it be-hind the scenes. (Yasuhiro Nagano)

11.[Alignment of Interests Leading to Guidance Toward Yen Appreciation] The respective domestic circumstances of "expanding U.S. exports (or correcting trade imbalances)" and "preventing Japan's imported inflation" precisely over-lapped on the single point of "correcting the weak yen and guiding it toward appreciation," leading to this historic cooperative action. (Yasuhiro Nagano)

12.[Political Risks from a Weak Dollar and Soaring Import Prices] A weak dollar leads to further import expansion and surging import prices, which I believe will widen the defection of consumers and importers away from Trump. To pre-vent this, Trump tariffs should be made virtually zero through "Balanced Coun-tervailing Tariffs." (Yasuhiro Nagano)

13.[Making Trump Tariffs Virtually Zero Through Balanced Countervailing Tar-iffs] Taking this opportunity, the Trump administration should not only pres-sure the BOJ for early interest rate hikes, but I propose that the U.S. itself in-troduce the "Balanced Countervailing Tariffs" policy aimed at resolving its trade deficit by balancing imports and exports and making tariffs virtually zero. (Ya-suhiro Nagano)

14.[Proposal for the Complete Elimination of the U.S. Trade Deficit] The Trump administration must utilize this juncture to thoroughly reform its trade struc-ture. (Yasuhiro Nagano)

15.[The Ultimate Trump Card for Economic Rebirth] The introduction of this new economic theory is the sole trump card to ensure the effects of the U.S.-Japan concerted intervention and fundamentally resolve the U.S. trade deficit. (Yasuhiro Nagano)

Part 1 References

U.S. and Japanese Authorities in Unusual Cooperation: Pressuring the BOJ for Rate Hikes – Concerted Intervention

https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2026080300897&g=eco

I will write again tomorrow.

Yasuhiro Nagano (Japanese)

2. Saturday Edition (土曜版)

Part 2: The Immigration Control Act Violation Case [Saturday Edition]

For the case overview (Chapters 1 and 2), please refer to the Weekday Edition.

Throughout this unjust trial, I consistently maintained my innocence based on rigorous legal logic. However, the police and prosecution ignored my arguments, attempting to coerce a confession based on arbitrary generalizations.

Read the full text here: To World Media

https://toworldmedia.blogspot.com/

[Chapter 3] Appeals to the International Community and Legal Contradictions

Article 31 of the Constitution of Japan guarantees due process, stating that no person shall be deprived of life or liberty except according to procedure established by law (the principle of legality). Yet, the prosecution in this case forcefully misapplied administrative provisions to fit the Penal Code’s definition of aiding and abetting. This demonstrates a severe lack of legal competence and constitutes an abuse of official authority.

Following our case in 2010 and a nearly identical incident involving Philippine Embassy staff in 2013, international criticism intensified against Japan's arbitrary enforcement of the law.

Consequently, the Japanese government amended the Immigration Control Act in December 2016 (effective January 2017) to explicitly criminalize the act of "providing false employment contracts."

This statutory amendment is irrefutable proof that no such crime existed under the previous law when we were charged, meaning we were entirely innocent. Article 39 of the Constitution strictly prohibits retroactive punishment (ex post facto laws). Despite this clear legal reality, the government has offered no apology, restoration of honor, or compensation.

[Chapter 4] Supporting Legal Documents

The official indictment and the validity of my legal arguments are publicly accessible through the following documents (available in Japanese and English):

Official Indictment (JA/EN)

http://www.miraico.jp/ICC-crime/2Related%20Documents/%EF%BC%91Indictment.pdf

My Legal Argument (Japanese)

https://blog.goo.ne.jp/nipponnoasa/e/d28c05d97af7a48394921a2dc1ae8f98

My Legal Argument (English)

https://blog.goo.ne.jp/nipponnoasa/e/ac718e4f2aab09297bdab896a94bd194

[Chapter 5] Petitions to International Organizations

Following my release, I sought redress from foreign embassies in Japan, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and the International Criminal Court (ICC).

An ambassador from an African nation advised me that while diplomatic ties prevented an official state protest, they could engage networks within the ICC. I believe this international pressure ultimately forced the 2016 statutory amendment.

The number of foreign nationals—including Chinese, Korean, Filipino, and American citizens—who fall victim to such arbitrary legal interpretations in Japan is estimated to be in the tens or hundreds of thousands. This is an alarming crisis that the international community cannot ignore.

Continued in the Sunday Edition.

Part 3: Special Economic Zones (Business Model)

Global Special Zone Project NO2

https://world-special-zone.seesaa.net/

Nagano Opinion NO1

https://naganoopinion.blog.jp/

*Please refer to the "Sunday Edition" for Parts 4 through 10.

Yasuhiro Nagano